

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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CULMINATING POINTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the world's security environment has shifted "...from a centralized threat of global war to a highly decentralized threat of diverse regional conflicts."¹ A 'Pandora's box' of crises has been opened, resulting in an increased international reliance on the United Nations (U.N.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as means for multilateral diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military actions. Case in point, the United Nations has initiated 22 peace operations since 1988, compared to 13 between 1945 and 1988.²

The Clinton Administration has recognized the importance of peace operations. The U.S. National Security Strategy states that peace operations, "from traditional peace keeping to peace enforcement are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly."³ The U.S. National Military Strategy was reformulated, with an emphasis consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy. The new military strategy focuses on "flexible and selective engagement" and "selective employment of military capabilities in peace,"⁴ with smaller forces and a reduced operating budget.⁵

A challenge to selective employment will be the U.S. military's involvement in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation (hereafter referred to as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR). In response to the ethnic and religious civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) between Croats, Muslims and Serbs, the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 1031 on 15 December 1995. The resolution authorized establishment of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR), with ground, air and maritime units from NATO nations, and non-NATO nations, to ensure compliance with relevant provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The agreement was signed by leaders of the three warring factions on 14 December 1995.

The United States has dedicated to IFOR a troop force numbering 20,000. IFOR's mission is "...to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects...,"⁶ to include:

- ◇ supervising selective boundary markings and Zones of Separation between the parties;
- ◇ monitoring force withdrawal to respective territories, and establishing Zones of Separation;

- ◇ assuming control of airspace over Bosnia and of military traffic movement over key ground routes;
- ◇ establishing Joint Military Commissions; and,
- ◇ assisting with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR.

IFOR is authorized, under NATO Rules of Engagement, to "...take such actions as required, including the necessary use of force, to ensure compliance...and to ensure its own protection."⁷

In this conflict-ridden area of the world, NATO military commanders in Bosnia must be prepared to respond to unique, sometimes adverse challenges. This paper introduces the hypothesis that the culminating point, a concept traditionally tied to warfare, can be applied to peace operations and to any Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). Toward that end, an analysis of past peace operations, and the resultant effect of culminating points, is provided as testimony. Finally, this paper proposes possible culminating points that may lie on the horizon in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK

To provide a deck plate from which to build a framework for the analysis that follows, it first necessary to supply points of reference and a terminology review.

The range of military operations from which the United States achieves its national objectives, protects its national interests, and meets various challenges extends from war to Military Operations Other Than War.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are military operations, which may or may not involve use of force, that focus on deterring wars and promoting peace.

Peace Operations, categorized by Joint Publication 3-07 as being part of MOOTW, are “military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement,”¹ and are further subdivided as follows:

- ◇ Peacekeeping operations are “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”²
- ◇ Peace enforcement operations are the “application of military force, or threat of its use...to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”³

In developing operations, U.S. military commanders practice operational art, which is the “employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war.”⁴ Components of operational art include:

- ◇ Principles of Operational Warfare
- ◇ Operational Factors
- ◇ Operational Functions
- ◇ Methods of Combat Forces’ Employment
- ◇ Combat Employment and Sustainment
- ◇ Operational Planning
- ◇ Operational Training

- ◇ Operational Leadership
- ◇ Elements of Operational Warfare⁵

The operational warfare element of the culminating point is the “point at which the balance of strength is reached between the attacking force and a defender...It is the combat power that culminates and the operational commander must determine his or her combat power relative to that of the opponent.”⁶ Carl von Clausewitz states that “victory normally results from the superiority of one side, from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological strength,” and that as “war unfolds, armies are constantly faced with some factors that increase their strength and with others that reduce it...every reduction on one side can be considered as an increase on the other.”⁷ A military force approaches, reaches or extends its culminating point due to changes in certain factors. These factors are:

- ◇ Risk of defeat caused by:
 - ◆ Loss or unavailability of forces.
 - ◆ Loss or unavailability of resources.
 - ◆ Enemy gain of forces and/or resources from other hostile countries.
- ◇ Change in situation.
- ◇ Ability to maintain lines of communication.
- ◇ Change in mission.
- ◇ Ability to maintain command and control.
- ◇ Ability to maintain a cohesive organization, which can be affected by:
 - ◆ Will of the people.
 - ◆ Morale of the forces.⁸

Military commanders must identify, and respond accordingly, to factors that may lead to possible culminating points, and that may tip their balance of strength.

Operational art applies across the entire range of military operations, from war to MOOTW. The element of the culminating point, however, is tied specifically to combat. The remainder of this paper will illustrate the hypothesis that the culminating point concept is equally applicable in peace operations, and will provide possible culminating points for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF CULMINATING POINTS

Relevant to the discussion of possible culminating points in JOINT ENDEAVOR is a review of selected past military operations in which culminating points impacted the operation's success.

Risk of defeat. The U.N. peace observation mission in Yemen (UNYOM) from 1963 to 1964 illustrates the culminating point of risk of defeat, caused by enemy gain of resources and forces from a hostile country. In September 1962, the dynastic ruler of Yemen was overthrown in a military coup. Following the coup, a civil war developed between Yemeni Royalist factions, supported with arms by Saudi Arabia, and Yemeni Republican factions, supported with troops and combat arms by Egypt. Throughout early 1963, the fighting escalated. Egypt was unable to monitor arms traffic between Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Saudi Arabia had no direct means of monitoring Egyptian troop movements in Yemen. Egypt's apprehension over its involvement turning into a long-term, costly deployment, and Saudi Arabia's concern that border areas shared with Yemen would be captured by Egyptian forces, enabled Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., to work out a disengagement agreement between the two countries. In April 1963, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen requested U.N. assistance in implementing the disengagement. Under the agreement, Saudi Arabia was to cease support, Egypt was to withdraw its troops, and a demilitarized zone along the Saudi and Yemeni border, 200 miles long and 12 miles wide, was created. UNYOM was established on 11 June 1963, with a force totaling just over 200 personnel, and minimal equipment and funding. UNYOM's mandate was limited to observing, certifying and reporting on the disengagement, but UNYOM forces did not have the authority to compel compliance. Despite initial willingness to disengage, the Saudi and Egyptian governments ultimately reneged for a variety of reasons and continued to provide warring factions with forces and arms. In September 1964, UNYOM was terminated, and the Yemeni Civil War continued for six years before winding down to a compromise settlement reached at a peace conference in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in March 1970. Mandated only as an observation mission, UNYOM exceeded its culminating point, given its uncertain financial provisions, inadequate size and limited political and military objectives.

Change in situation. A culminating point exceeded in peace operations due to a change in situation ordinarily means the operation, as originally mandated, was unsuccessful. The operation is either terminated,

or reassessed and given a new mandate. An example of how a peace operation failed due to a change in situation is the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, UNFICYP.

Violence erupted on 21 December 1963 between Greek and Turk communities in Cyprus over division concerning the 1960 Zurich negotiations, which established the Republic of Cyprus, recognized Cyprus' independence from the United Kingdom, and included arrangements designed to promote peaceful coexistence between the two communities. By 24 December, a truce negotiated by the British, Turkish, Greek and Cypriot governments was arranged, and a peacekeeping force consisting of contingents already on island was formed. This arrangement was insufficient to contain the violence. In February 1964, the United Kingdom and Cyprus requested U.N. assistance. UNFICYP was created in March 1964, with a mandate to "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."¹ The UNFICYP forces, whose numbers would reach 6,400, did what they could to prevent incidents, overseeing disarmament, patrolling demilitarized zones, and trying to end fighting through persuasion and negotiation. A minimum of force was to be used. Yet the Greek and Turk Cypriots distrusted each other, and arms and ammunition were reasonably available from their parent countries. The U.N. forces were able to prevent major outbreaks in violence, but the situation degenerated to the 1974 Greek Cypriot military coup by Nikos Sampson over Cypriot President Makarios. The coup led to Turkish military intervention of 40,000 troops in Northern Cyprus. Through negotiations between Foreign Ministers from the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, peace was restored and a cease fire established. Cyprus was partitioned, with the Turkish Cypriots controlling northern Cyprus, the Greeks controlling the south, and in between, a UNFICYP controlled buffer zone.

In summary, UNFICYP was not equipped to respond to the large scale Turkish military intervention in 1974. UNFICYP's mandate and structure was tailored to curb intercommunal violence, not to stand off a large combat force. UNFICYP's inability to handle this change in situation caused the peacekeeping operation to exceed its culminating point.

Ability to maintain lines of communication. Key to the success of any military operation are viable sea, land, and air lines of communication. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping effort provides a case in point.

In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon; the underlying cause of which was the Lebanese President's attempt to change the law to allow himself a second term. The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLO), Syria and Israel were the players in the war. Repeated complaints by the Lebanese government to the United Nations about Israeli attacks on Lebanese soil fell on deaf ears. Not until Israel's invasion of Lebanon in March 1978 did the United Nations respond, creating UNIFIL. UNIFIL's mandate was to:

- ◊ Confirm an immediate Israeli cease fire and withdrawal from Lebanese territory;
- ◊ Restore international peace and security; and,
- ◊ Ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.²

A U.N. buffer zone was established in southern and southwestern Lebanon. UNIFIL's headquarters, however, was located in Naqoura, in the southeastern tip of the 'enclave,' a piece of land between the buffer zone and the Israeli and Syrian borders. This enclave was controlled by Israeli-supported Christian militias (de facto Israeli forces), led by Major Haddad. Although UNIFIL troops had free access to the main roads in the enclave to allow the rotation of personnel and resupply, and UNIFIL helicopters could use enclave airspace with prior approval, Major Haddad could still restrict UNIFIL's freedom of movement at will. These restrictions impaired UNIFIL's ability to operate as an integrated unit. At times, U.N. observation posts in the enclave were isolated, even broken into and looted, by Haddad's militiamen. In some cases, U.N. personnel were harassed and threatened. Unable to maintain viable lines of communication, UNIFIL exceeded its culminating point. Over the next four years, UNIFIL was unable to secure a congruous, stable buffer zone, and the situation in Lebanon grew increasingly unstable. Syrians and the PLO were laying siege to and attacking Lebanese villages and settlements, and even Israeli settlements along the northern Israeli border. In response, in June 1982, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon.

Change in mission. A relevant case for how change in mission affected a peace operation is the U.S. involvement in the non-U.N. Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 through February 1984.

As mentioned in the UNIFIL case study, the IDF attacked Lebanon in June 1982, fighting a war in southern Lebanon against the PLO, and against Syrians in eastern Lebanon. The IDF continued to move up the

Lebanese coast. They linked up with the Lebanese Army, moved into Beirut, and on 2 July, determined to squeeze the PLO out, declared a military blockade of the city. In response to a Lebanese request for assistance in the PLO evacuation, a U.S. organized MNF with troops from the United States, France and Italy deployed to Beirut in late August. By 9 September, PLO pullout was complete, and the MNF departed. On 14 September, Lebanese President-elect Gemayel and 20 others were killed in an explosion from a bomb hidden by a Syrian socialist. What followed was a horrendous massacre of over 1,000 Palestinians, mostly old men, women and children, by Phalange elements of the Lebanese Forces, in Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila. The MNF returned, this time as an interposition force, with a mandate to:

- ◇ Establish an environment to permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities;
- ◇ Assist the Lebanese government in bringing an end to violence; and,
- ◇ Facilitate the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and authority.³

The U.S. Marine Corps contingent of the MNF established their headquarters at an abandoned building at the Beirut International Airport.

In November, the U.S. contingent took on a new role: To assist the Lebanese government in rebuilding its undertrained, undermanned Lebanese National Army. The U.S. mission in Lebanon had changed. Not only were the Marines there to keep the peace, but also to train the Lebanese Army. No longer considered neutral, the United States became a target of Muslim extremists. Despite the change in mission, the Peacetime Rules of Engagement (PROE) were still in effect: "actions taken by U.S. forces ashore in Lebanon would be for self defense only, reprisal or punitive measures would not be initiated, and "hostile forces" would not be pursued."⁴ The peacekeeping environment became more hostile. Feuds between various factions continued. The IDF began to patrol south of the airport, which led to numerous confrontations with U.S. Marines. On 18 April 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed, killing over 60 people. Factional fighting escalated, and the multinational forces came under fire. Security measures at the airport Marine Headquarters were tightened up, although Marine sentries on guard duty were armed only with empty firearms. The heightened security measures were not enough to prevent a yellow Mercedes from entering the airport early morning on 23 October and crashing into the Marine Headquarters, exploding the equivalent of 12,000 lbs. of explosives. The building collapsed, killing 241 U.S. Marine, Navy, and other personnel, and wounding over 100 others.

The U.S. Marine contingent to the MNF exceeded its culminating point when its mission changed, and the PROE were not reassessed. The Muslim extremists were "aware of the restraints and manipulated the rules...the Marines perceived weakness gave the initiative to the other side."⁵

Command and control. Command and control, the "exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission,"⁶ is one of the most important functions of a military operation. A notable example of failure of command and control can be found in the U.S. involvement in the Somalia peace enforcement operation.

In late 1991, a battle to control Mogadishu, Somalia's capitol, erupted between followers of General Aided and followers of the interim Somali president, Ali Mahdi. Hostilities and related deteriorating social conditions led the U.N. Security Council to issue a resolution on 23 January 1992, calling for a cease fire, an embargo on weapons shipments, and increased humanitarian aid to Somalia. The peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM, was established on 24 April, followed by the deployment of the U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) on 9 December. UNITAF's charge was to restore order and stabilize the situation. UNOSOM was terminated on 30 April 1993, and UNITAF's mission ended 4 May. Both succeeded in bringing an end to starvation and allowing near normal conditions to return. UNOSOM II took over as the successor force, the first ever U.N. directed peace operation mandated under Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the U.N. Charter. U.S. forces remained as part of the U.N. operation.

The UNOSOM II U.N. force commander was Turkish General Bir. His deputy was Major General Montgomery, who also served as commander of U.S. forces in Somalia (USFORSOM). Following an attack by Aided loyalists on 5 June that killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, U.S. Army Special Forces (Rangers) were deployed to Somalia, in hopes of capturing Aided. The Army Rangers, under the command of Major General Garrison, who in turn reported to U.S. Central Command, arrived in August, with the understanding that Major General Montgomery would be notified before every Ranger operation and could veto any raid that interfered with U.N. operations. On 3 October, the Rangers decided to raid a building in Mogadishu where Aided's deputies were meeting. Major General Montgomery was notified of the operation that afternoon, and gave the go ahead. Lieutenant Colonel Davis, the ground element commander of U.S. Central Command's Quick Reaction Force (QRF)(the QRF was under Major General Montgomery's tactical

command) was also notified. The QRF had normally been used as back up for the Rangers, but this time there was no coordination. The raid did succeed and 24 deputies were captured, but as the Ranger Black Hawk helicopters moved out, the lead helicopter was shot down. The Rangers split up, leaving about 100 soldiers with the downed helicopter, the remainder returning with prisoners and U.S. wounded. Aided clansmen began firing from rooftops and alleyways, and as the Rangers remained at the crash site awaiting rescue, casualties mounted. A second Black Hawk helicopter was shot down, and the pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durrant, was captured by the clansmen. The Rangers, assuming their plan would succeed, had no contingency plan. The QRF had no sense of the help it may have to provide (only that the Rangers were conducting an operation) and was not given any details. Lack of coordination and communication between the QRF and the Rangers resulted in the situation deteriorating. In the end, 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded, and the clansmen had a prisoner of 'war.'

Ability to maintain a cohesive organization. This author was unable to identify a peace operation for which cohesive organization was a culminating point. However, U.S. involvement in Vietnam demonstrates how the will of the people and morale of the forces directly relates to maintaining a cohesive organization.

Throughout the early and mid-1960s, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson used a strategy of gradual escalation in the war against North Vietnam, progressively increasing the number of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, while maintaining public support at home. As the North Vietnamese continued to match our escalations, the U.S. government sidestepped questions about when the war would end while assuring the public of ultimate success. Additionally, the 'new' television medium began to influence U.S. opinion of the war in a way no other media forum could. Television brought the reality of the war into U.S. living rooms. Television showed how horrible, destructive and terrible the war was -- in living color. As General Fred Weyand, Army Chief of Staff in the late 1970s, stated: "...we should have made the realities of war obvious to American people before they witnessed it on their television screens."⁷ U.S. public opinion became the essential domino. U.S. leaders knew it, North Vietnamese leaders knew it and used this vulnerability to their benefit. The North Vietnamese launched a large scale offensive on 31 January 1968, the start of the Buddhist Tet New Year holiday. This unprecedented, countrywide assault, which lasted through March, of every major South Vietnamese city, marked the culminating point for the United States. Although the Tet Offensive was a

tactical loss for the North Vietnamese, it was a strategic victory. The net effect of television's coverage of Tet events spurred the U.S. public into its first real misgivings about the war and moved the public into active dissent, resulting in:

- ◇ President Johnson stabilizing U.S. involvement and exploring a negotiated settlement;
- ◇ President Johnson withdrawing himself as a nominee for the 1968 presidential elections; and,
- ◇ Public opposition shifting toward the military and away from the government. There were draft dodgers, riots, demonstrations, sit-ins, underground newspapers and infiltration by anti-war supporters into the military. These influences had a direct, negative effect on the morale of U.S. armed forces.

“Without the commitment of the American people [to the Vietnam War] the commitment of the army to prolonged combat was impossible.”⁸

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

The obstacles encountered in past military peace operations could be encountered in Bosnia. This chapter applies the lessons learned as cautions for NATO military commanders.

Risk of defeat, change in situation and change in mission. For Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, some contend there is no risk of defeat since the Croat, Muslim and Serb factions have committed themselves to upholding the peace agreement. Others could say there is no risk of defeat because NATO countries can, as required, augment forces and supplement resources. Nevertheless, five 'what if' questions bear asking:

- ◇ What if any of the former warring factions, all of which have withdrawn their forces behind the Zones of Separation (ZOS), return to the zones?
- ◇ What if the factions do not demobilize their forces, or if they do, remobilize?
- ◇ What if the factions do not withdraw their heavy weaponry from the ZOS?
- ◇ What if foreign forces, such as the Islamic mujahedden warriors and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, do not withdraw? Or, if they do, they return?
- ◇ What if other third party nations or forces ally themselves with the warring factions? Russian Defense Minister Grachev, in meetings with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry and Ukrainian President Shmarov in Kiev on 4 January 1996, said expansion of the NATO defense alliance to Eastern Europe could prompt Russia to consider creating a group of forces "consistent with new real threats."¹ Plus, although the Russian IFOR contingent is eager to show its neutrality, some observers "...are skeptical of the Russian's ability to be neutral given their homeland's historic ties to Serbs..."²

Materialization of any of the foregoing 'what ifs' could lead to a risk of defeat and to a change in situation, and could require reassessment of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR's mission. IFOR would have the option of taking military action against any of the non-compliers, but hopefully as a last resort. Use of a gamut of international political and economic pressures could prove more successful.

Maintaining lines of communication for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR could be a difficult task for NATO commanders.

The first concern is the weather. Snowstorms and fog initially delayed the airlift of U.S. forces and supplies into Tuzla, the planned debarkation point, and forced flight diversions to Belgrade, over 100 miles away. The weather, and related flooding, held up construction of a pontoon bridge connecting the road between Croatia and Bosnia. The road is to be used as a highway for tanks and armored vehicles. Between weather and war-related bombings, navigable roads in Bosnia are few and far between. Case in point, there is now only one route connecting Gorazde with the rest of Muslim-held Bosnia.

A second concern is IFOR geographic areas of responsibility in Bosnia: U.S. forces are assigned the northeast sector, which includes the city of Tuzla; British forces are assigned the northwest sector, which includes the cities of Bihac and Banja Luka; and French forces are assigned the southern sector, which includes the cities of Sarajevo, Mostar and Gorazde. Are the multinational forces equipped to handle 'hot spots' such as Sarajevo and Mostar? Already, U.S. Army Apache helicopters have been dispatched to help protect Sarajevo airport, an area assigned to French forces. If this concern materializes, IFOR has several options, some of which include reassigning geographic areas of responsibility, improving IFOR's force posture, or fragmenting already present national forces. The least preferred option is fragmenting forces, which could hamper logistics sustainment and systems interoperability.

Command and control. IFOR commanders must remain sensitive to the criticality of maintaining effective command and control in a multinational operation environment to avoid breakdowns as exemplified in the October 1993 Somali Ranger operation. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is the first coalition operation between NATO forces, NATO Partnership for Peace forces and other non-NATO countries. Unity of effort between multinational forces and throughout the chain of command must be maintained by means of extensive liaison and communication. Objectives must be clear, plans must be lucid, and Rules of Engagement must be explicit, yet simple enough to be understood by any Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine from any of the IFOR nations. IFOR has the authority to take military actions as required, to include use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with the peace agreement, and to ensure IFOR's protection. In an area of the world that was at war for four years over ethnic-religious conflicts with at least 200,000 killed and over 2 million left homeless, odds are there will be cease-fire violations. Odds are there will be attempts to challenge the peacekeeping force. In the few weeks following the agreement signature, there have already

been small arms attacks against NATO aircraft and personnel, and several sniper shootings at IFOR personnel. If military force is to be used, it must be used prudently, and IFOR personnel must know if, when, and how to respond.

Maintaining a cohesive organization. U.S. involvement in Bosnia could be affected by the will of the people. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is mandated "for a period of approximately one year."³ Yet, as Joint Publication 3-0 states: "peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects."⁴ Historically, U.S. popular support for military operations has had a propensity to diminish when those operations either fail to succeed or exceed the expected timeframe. Cohesion may be threatened by lack of U.S. commitment beyond one year. Regardless, the U.S. government must ensure the legitimacy of IFOR's involvement is sustained. President Clinton recognized the need to engender the commitment of the U.S. public and announced his decision, on national television, to send U.S. forces to Bosnia. As the Program Director for KCNR 1320 AM in Salt Lake City, Utah said: "with Johnny down the street being sent there, the topic has hit home."⁵ Cable News Network provides Bosnia updates in their half hourly Headline News programs. There are Bosnia updates in the first few pages of U.S. daily newspapers. The Bosnian situation is fragile, and the U.S. public must periodically be reassured of the legitimacy and necessity of our involvement.

Another factor that can influence cohesion is morale. Military spirit and, as described by Carl von Clausewitz, "discipline, skill, goodwill, pride and high morale," are the best attributes of our military. These attributes "command respect, but have no strength on their own. They stand or fall together. One crack, and the whole thing goes, like a glass too quickly cooled."⁶ Military commanders in Bosnia must do their utmost to keep up force morale. The first challenge is to uphold a politically sensitive and extremely delicate cease fire in an environment described by Army Surgeon General Lieutenant General Alcide M. LaNoue as "...very stark" where the "sanitation is atrocious."⁷ The second challenge is the military commander must understand the time consuming property of peacekeeping and inherent disadvantages. Although rewarding, peacekeeping can be monotonous, frustrating, and at times, dangerous.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The outcome of war is victory or defeat. The outcome of peacekeeping operations is less precise, since there is no intention to fight or win.

Success in Bosnia will be keeping the peace, and eventually in seeing a civil war that ends with elections, a new constitution, a military balance, the trial of war criminals, and power sharing. The initiative to uphold the peace ultimately lies with the Croats, Muslims and Serbs; the power to ensure the peace is complied with lies with IFOR.

IFOR's mission in Bosnia is straightforward, well defined, and supported by all parties. On the surface, the mission appears simple, if the situation remains unchanged. But no military operation remains static, and there exists the potential for events that will challenge the success of keeping the peace -- and that could cause a culminating point.

This paper provides cautions for military commanders to consider as they execute their mission in Bosnia. IFOR commanders must maintain their situational awareness, and must continuously be on the lookout for indicators of change—indicators that may well lead to a culminating point.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

- ¹ Gary L. Guertner, The Armed Forces in a New Political Environment (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 3.
- ² Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, ed., Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 102.
- ³ U.S. President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: n.p., 1995), 16.
- ⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), ii-iv.
- ⁵ The U.S. military's force end strength decreased from 2,130,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 to 1,525,000 in FY-95, and operating budget reduced from \$292 billion in FY-88 to \$252 billion in FY-95. Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1989 (Arlington, VA: Navy League of the United States, 1989), 120. Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1995 (Arlington, VA: Navy League of the United States, 1995), 108.
- ⁶ U.S. State Dept., Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Washington: n.p., 1995), 2.
- ⁷ U.S. State Dept., Dayton Peace Agreement (Washington: n.p., 1995), 6.

CHAPTER II

- ¹ U.S. Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington: n.p., 1995), III-12.
- ² Ibid, GL-4.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ U.S. Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: n.p., 1995), GL-10.
- ⁵ Professor M. N. Vego, handout from Operations Class #5, "Operational Art," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 16 November 1995, 12.
- ⁶ U.S. Naval War College Joint Maritime Operations Department, Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus 1995-1996 (Newport, RI: n.p., 1995), 27.
- ⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 566-567.
- ⁸ The factors listed are a compendium of factors listed in FM 100-5 Operations and factors proposed by the author. U.S. Army Department, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington: n.p., 1993), 6-8.

CHAPTER III

- ¹ William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 224.

² Ibid, 187.

³ Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsback, ed., The Multinational Force in Beirut 1982 - 1984 (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1991), 12.

⁴ David Evans, "Navy and Marine Corps Team in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 1984 Naval Review issue, p. 134.

⁵ McDermott, 61.

⁶ U.S. Joint Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: n.p., 1995), 78.

⁷ Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 40.

⁸ Ibid, 13.

CHAPTER IV

¹ Charles Aldinger, "Russian defense chief warns NATO not to expand," Washington Times, 5 January 1996, p. 15.

² Elizabeth Shogren, "Russia-U.S. Alliance is Being Met With Scrutiny, Skepticism," Los Angeles Times, 24 January 1996, p. 3.

³ U.S. State Dept., Dayton Peace Agreement, 6.

⁴ U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, V-3.

⁵ Bob Cudmore, "Topic nobody wanted," Talkers Magazine as quoted in Washington Times, 4 January 1996, p. 2.

⁶ von Clausewitz, 189.

⁷ _____, "GIs in Bosnia battle cold, rats," Washington Times, 4 January 1996, p.2.

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